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AMERICAN UTILIZATION OF THE MEXICAN
BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION
This comment will illustrate the utilization by United States
industry of the Mexican Border Industrialization Program. The
Border Industrialization Program is an attempt by the Mexican
government to solve the problem of high unemployment of their
people along the United States-Mexico border while protecting
their domestic industry. Under this program an abundant supply
of labor is available whereby United States industry, by locating
plants within Mexico along the border, may utilize the program
and provide employment for the Mexican worker. Raw materials
may be imported duty free into Mexico where they are assembled
into a product which is then exported from the country thereby
not affecting Mexico's domestic market. The exported product
may be then further perfected or marketed as a salable product.
Specifically, this comment is concerned with the events lead-
ing to the evolution of the Mexican Border Industrialization Pro-
gram. The already existing legislative means that are employed
by United States industry in order to facilitate such an operation
are analyzed. Finally an analysis is presented as to the benefits
derived by Mexico and the United States through the utilization of
that program.
BACKGROUND ON MEXICAN TRADE POLICY AND
EVENTS EFFECTING THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MEXICAN BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
Mexico's trade policy reflects a desire by the Mexican gov-
ernment to meet the high unemployment problems and to promote
its domestic industry. The policy of import substitution empha-
sizes industrialization. Import substitution restricts the issuance
of import licenses on those products produced domestically.'
Thus Mexico's domestic market is given to its own industry to the
extent of domestic capacity with the goal of self-sufficiency. 2
There is evidence that import substitution has worked. In recent
1. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports 69-16, Foreign
Trade Regulations of Mexico 1 (1969).
2. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Industrial and Employment Potential of the
United States-Mexico Border 265 (1968).
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years Mexican imports of consumer goods have declined while
imports of supplementary goods, raw materials and components
have been of major importance.'
Mexico, with an estimated population of 49 million in 1969,
has an alarming current annual rate of growth of 3.6% .4  This is
the highest rate of growth of any major country in Latin America.5
Thus the population of Mexico provides a potentially huge internal
market, yet the domestic purchasing power does not adequately
support mass consumption of Mexican products.'
In 1960 fifty-one percent of the population was concentrated
in the urban areas. 7 The continual migration from the rural farm
areas has pushed the current urban population to about sixty per-
cent of the total population.' In 1968 the agricultural sector of the
economy grew by only 4% while the manufacturing and fuels ad-
vanced more rapidly with increases from 6 to 9 percent above
1967 levels.' The average annual rate of increase in the gross
national product (GNP) from 1950 through 1968 was more than
6% after adjustment for price changes. 10 More than half of the
economically active population is engaged in agriculture." Yet
less than 20 percent of the GNP comprises agricultural produc-
tion."2 In spite of the high rate of growth in the GNP, the annual
per capita income of the rural population is approximately $125
and the annual per capita income of the average urban dweller is
about $650. l" The existence of the great mass of poverty in the
rural areas, which are noticeably lacking in jobs, is one reason for
the flight of the worker and his family to the northern border area
3. Foreign Trade Regulations of Mexico, supra note 1.
4. Business Week, July 12, 1969, at 121.
5. U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1968, at 78.
6. Industrial and Employment Potential of the United States-Mexico Border,
supra note 2, at 266.
7. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Mexico: A Market for U.S. Products vii
(1966).
8. Business Week, July 12, 1969, at 121.
9. U.S. Dep't. of State, Pub. No. 7865, Background Notes: Mexico 4
(June 1969).
10. Id. at 3. In 1969 the economy of Mexico increased by 6.4% from
1968 levels. San Diego Union, July 26, 1970, § B (Local News), at 23, col. 5.
11. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports 68-43, Establish-
ing a Business in Mexico 12 (1968).





California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 [1970], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol1/iss1/9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
and the resulting rapid growth of the Mexican border cities. 4
The attraction of employment and higher wages, not offered in the
rural areas, has had an impact on the border areas. As a result
of this migration and the high birth rate, the northern border area
is expected to have the highest rate of population growth of any
region in Mexico with an average annual increase for the 1960's
of 5.7%.15
The northern border area encompasses a twelve and a half
mile deep area along the two thousand mile United States-Mexico
border. In an effort to rehabilitate the border towns and bring
them actively within the Mexican economy with a resultant reduc-
tion of their dependence on the United States as a source of sup-
ply, the Mexican government in 1961 announced the Programa
Nacional Fronterizo (PRONAF: National Border Program).
PRONAF is a subsidy program promoting import substitution
within the border area and increasing the sale of domestic products
to tourists in the Mexican border cities.' 6 The transportation of
Mexican products manufactured in the central area of the country
to the northern area is subsidized under PRONAF. PRONAF
also makes governmental investments for the development of the
border area industry. 17
Though PRONAF achieved great success in increasing sales
in the border area from June 1961 to December 1966 and was an
influencing factor in the 48% increase in tourist spending, it could
not keep pace with spreading unemployment in the area.'8 The
termination of the Bracero program 9 by the United States in 1965
contributed to the already high unemployment rate of the area.
Under the Bracero program2" as many as 400,000 Mexicans were
permitted to enter the United States for seasonal agricultural work. 21
Upon the termination of the Bracero program many of the Mexi-
can workers decided to remain in the border area rather than go
14. Industrial and Employment Potential of the United States-Mexico Bor-
der, supra note 2, at 267.
15. Report of the Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration
179 (1968) U.S. Government Printing Office.
16. H. Walker, Jr., Border Industries with a Mexican Accent, 4 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 25, 26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Walker].
17. Industrial and Employment Potential of the United States-Mexico Bor-
der, supra note 2, at 23.
18. Walker, supra note 16, at 27.
19. Act of Dec. 13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 STAT. 363.
20. 7 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
21. Walker, supra note 16, at 27.
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back to the even harsher economic conditions in the interior of
Mexico.22
The rapid development of a semi-industrialized state in Mex-
ico was inadequate to provide the needs of the people in the border
area. As a result, further change in the Mexican Trade Policy as
it affected the border area was impelled. Import substitution
while effective in other regions of Mexico was not effective in the
border area since it did not adequately fulfill the employment needs
of the worker. The need for greater capital expenditures could not
be met by PRONAF.
Early in 1966, the Mexican government promulgated its
Border Industrialization Program as an extension of PRONAF.23
The plan was simple-a program to industrialize the Mexican
border area with capital from outside the country. The means
were provided to attract critically needed foreign capital in order
to meet the growing population problem in the area. The program
allows complete foreign ownership of industry in the border area
by encouraging the establishment of labor-intensive activities pro-
ducing for export.24  Import licenses are granted for importation
of duty free machinery for use in manufacturing or assembly
plants. Raw materials, parts, and components of products are
imported free of duty on a temporary basis. After being proc-
essed, or assembled in Mexico into finished or semi-finished prod-
ucts, they must be exported in their entirety from Mexico to any
foreign country. The only other requirement of the program is
that Mexican labor be used. 5
The importance of the program is its ability to create new
employment where unemployment is estimated to be as high as 40-
50 percent in some of the border area cities.2 6  It is projected that
there is a need for approximately 500,000 new jobs annually in
Mexico with its present annual rate of population growth.27 The
22. Id.
23. Excelsior, Jan. 27, 1966, at 1.
24. Labor-intensive activities include those industries which manufacture a
product having a labor content of at least 50% of the manufacturing costs.
Typical industries utilizing the Border Industrialization Program produce a full
range of electronic components, toys, and clothing. See Walker, supra note 16,
at 27.
25. J. Treviflo, Border Assembly Operations, MFXICAN-AmICAN REVIEW,
April 1969, at 31.
26. Walker, supra note 16, at 27.
27. J. Trevifio, Border Assembly Operations, MEXICAN-AMERICAN REVIEW,
April 1969, at 31. Of 204 persons employed at Trad Electronics, S. A. de C. V.
1970
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Border Industrialization Program was intended and designed to
help remedy the problems of existing unemployment and to help
remedy the employment needs of an expanding labor force. 28
HOW THE BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
AFFECTS U.S. INDUSTRY AND HOW U.S. INDUSTRY
UTILIZES THE PROGRAM
The United States has been involved since World War II in
trade liberalization programs designed around our trade relations
with other countries. 9 In 1965, as a result of freer trade, over a
billion dollars worth of labor-intensive manufactured goods with
a labor content above 50% of U.S. manufactured costs entered
the United States under an ad valorem tariff of 25% or less.3"
In 1968 over 2.1 billion dollars worth of labor-intensive manu-
factured goods entered the United States under the U.S. trade lib-
eralization programs. 1  This represented an overall growth rate
of about 30% per year since 1965 and reflected a steady increase
of labor-intensive goods that are imported into the United States.
The influx of these imported goods into the United States af-
fected domestic markets and U.S. industry's profitability. The
foreign exporting countries generated employment in their indus-
tries through the use of lower wages than that prescribed by the
United States. The U.S. consumer demanded a low priced product
and, as such, further encouraged the importation of low priced
products for sale on the U.S. market.3 2  Sales by U.S. industry in
in Piedras Negras, Coah., 81% of the personnel had no permanent employment
prior to being employed at Trad Electronics. See Spending Pattern Employees
Trad Electronics report from Howard L. Walker, Jr., American Consul, to
William F. Keyes, Mexican Embassy, Oct. 16, 1969, copy on file at the CALI-
FORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OFFICE.
28. J. Treviflo, Border Assembly Operations, MEXICAN-AMERICAN REVIEW,
April 1969, at 31.
29. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Report of the National Export Expansion
Council Action Committee on U.S. Trade and Investment in Developing Coun-
tries 23 (1967).
30. Arthur D. Little, Inc., Current Trends in Mexican Industrial Develop-
ment 3 (1967?). Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan contributed almost 50% of
the total labor-intensive manufactured goods that were imported into the United
States in 1965. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, General Imports (1968).
31. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, General Imports (1968). In 1968 Japan,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan contributed almost 52% of the total U.S. imports of
labor-intensive manufactured goods. Taiwan had an annual growth rate for the
1965-1968 period of 125%.
32. The United Steel Workers estimate 20,000 steelworkers have lost jobs
in recent years in the United States because of imported steel, yet some of the
Vol. 1
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the United States of wholly domestic-manufactured products, of
the same quality and reliability as those imported into the United
States, suffered as a result of the lower manufacturing cost of im-
ported products on the domestic market.33
United States labor-intensive industries located within the
U.S. are the least profitable of all U.S. manufacturing industries."
Several U.S. labor-intensive industries decided to locate plants
in Mexico in order to reduce costs and compete with the already
low priced imports on the U.S. market. The determination to lo-
cate a plant in Mexico was based on several factors. Mexico has
a stable government, economy and monetary policy.315 Approxi-
mately 70% of the Mexican people are literate.36  The working
force is available and easily trained.3 7 Its proximity to the United
States with reduced transportation costs help offset the higher
wages paid in Mexico relative to Asia. United States foreign pol-
icy as it applies to Mexico provides, inter alia,
1. To cooperate in the development of a modem economy,
linked with that of other hemisphere countries, including
the United States, through a mutually beneficial system
of trade and investment;
2. To encourage active participation of United States private
investment in the form needed by Mexico for its economic
growth.38
The form of investment needed by Mexico was that promulgated
by the Mexican government in the Border Industrialization Pro-
gram. Thus, companies like Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., and Warwick
Electronics, Inc., established foreign plants in Mexico in an effort to
reduce costs until technological advances enabled profitable man-
ufacture in the United States."
steel unionists of the U.S.W. drive foreign cars. Business Week, January 10,
1970, at 29.
33. Letter from Donald J. Burke, Warwick Electronics, Inc., to the writer,
Nov. 18, 1969, on file at the CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
OFFICE.
34. H.R. Rep. No. 638, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1966).
35. Letter from Donald J. Burke to the writer, supra note 33.
36. U.S. Dep't. of State, Pub. No. 7865, Background Notes: Mexico I
(June 1969).
37. Letter from Donald J. Burke to the writer, supra note 33.
38. U.S. Dep't. of State, Pub. No. 7865, Background Notes: Mexico
5 (June 1969).
39. Letter from Sarkes Tarzian, Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., to Al R. Wichtrich,
Oct. 29, 1969, copy on file at the CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL OFFICE; Letter from Donald J. Burke to the writer, supra note 33; and
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On March 26, 1969, there were ninety-nine companies in op-
eration under the Border Industrialization Program.40 Sixty-three
of those companies were surveyed in a report dated July 1969 by
the International Trade Investment Committee of The American
Chamber of Commerce of Mexico.41 Seventy-six percent of those
companies interviewed had been in operation one year or longer.
All the companies included in the survey evidenced low-wage labor
as one of the principal interests in the establishment of their com-
pany in Mexico. Mexican wages are low compared to U.S. stand-
ards yet their wages are rising more rapidly than those in the U.S.
with an average annual increase of about nine percent during the
past seven year period.4" Other principal interests in a Mexican
location, as evidenced in the American Chamber of Commerce of
Mexico report,43 were the availability of labor, ease of administra-
tion and the short transit time because of the proximity to the
United States.
The benefits accruing to United States industry through a
border area location are not without responsibilities. By locating
a plant in Mexico, U.S. industry must recognize the rights of the
worker and perform the duties related to those rights. Article 123
of the Mexican constitution is concerned with the labor laws of
Mexico. Under this article, the worker is granted the right to or-
ganize and to defend his interests. This includes the right to
strike.44 By 1968 about 3 million Mexican workers had been
organized representing over fifty percent of the non-agricultural
labor force and about twenty-five percent of the economically ac-
tive population.45 The most influential union confederation is the
Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM: Confederation
of Mexican Workers). CTM is also the largest union confedera-
Reid, El Paso-Juarez Twin Plant Concept: What it is-How it works, Executive
Conference On World Trade, El Paso Chamber of Commerce 8 (1969).
40. The Mexican government has recently announced that there are "190
assembly plants from Tijuana to Nuevo Laredo." San Diego Union, May 2, 1970,
§ A, at 9, col. 4. All of those assembly plants are probably not in operation
under the Border Industrialization Program.
41. American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, A.C., Survey on Border
Development Program 2-5 (July 1969).
42. J. Richards, El Paso-Juarez Economic Siamese Twins, Executive Con-
ference on World Trade, El Paso Chamber of Commerce 4 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Richards]. See Business Week, Jan. 17, 1970, at 102.
43. Survey on Border Development Program, supra note 41. See text
accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
44. CONSTITUTION OF UNITED MEXICAN STATES ART. 123, § XVI.
45. Establishing a Business in Mexico, supra note 11, at 13.
Vol. I
7
Rumbaugh: American Utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Prog
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1970
MEXICAN BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
tion within Mexico with an estimated membership of about two
million workers in 1968.46
In 1949 CTM initiated efforts to unify the trade union move-
ment in Mexico. The result was the formation of the Bloque de
Unidad Obrera (Labor Unity Bloc) which represents between
eighty and ninety percent of organized labor.47 Other major la-
bor organizations include the Confederacion Revolucionaria de
Obreros y Campesinos (CROC: Revolutionary Confederation of
Workers and Farmers) and the Confederacion Regional Obrera
Mexicana (CROM: Regional Confederation of Mexican Work-
ers). CROM is also a member of the Labor Unity Bloc.4 8
The Labor Unity Bloc has substantial influence and is the
most important policymaking group in Mexican labor. The Labor
Unity Bloc and CROC give effective support to the dominant po-
litical party, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI: Revolu-
tionary Institutional Party). About one-third of PRI's National
Council seats are held by trade union representatives. 49 The de-
velopment of strong labor organizations in Mexico has been facili-
tated by the government and the dominant political party, PRI-11
In the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico report,5
almost 40 percent of the companies, involved in the Border Indus-
trialization Program that were surveyed, have employees rep-
resented by either CTM, CROC, or CROM. CTM represents the
employees in a third of all the companies interviewed. In addition
there were three companies that had company unions. The labor
relations of companies having unions were substantially satisfac-
tory.5 2 The efficiency of the labor force was satisfactory in 97
percent of all the companies interviewed. 53  An officer of Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc., with approximately 800 employees at plants in
Nuevo Laredo and Piedras Negras, has stated: "[W]e have found
a good solid and stable labor force . . . that want and need the
employment and are offering excellent productivity for us." '5 4
46. Id. at 14.
47. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't. of Labor, Bull. No. 240, Labor
Law and Practice in Mexico 33-34 (1963).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Establishing a Business in Mexico, supra note 11, at 13.
51. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
52. Out of 28 companies having unions, 25 reported they had satisfactory
relations. Survey on Border Development Program, supra note 41, at 12.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Letter from Sarkes Tarzian to Al R. Wichtrich, supra note 39.
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The Mexican constitution further provides for the establish-
ment of minimum wages. The Mexican concept of minimum wage
considers a given geographical area and the needs of the worker.55
The companies located in the border area utilizing the Border In-
dustrialization Program have currently employed about 20,000
Mexican workers.5 6 The minimum wage rates apply to most of
these employees in the border plants 7 and the rates for the
various regions of Mexico are revised biennially by a national
commission. 58  Fringe benefits usually increase the actual labor
cost of the manufacturer about 30 percent. The approximate
daily wages paid in industry in Ciudad Juarez range from the
minimum allowable for the unskilled worker to almost six times
the minimum wage for the skilled worker. 9 Yet, the daily wages
in El Paso, Texas, across the Rio Grande from Ciudad Juarez,
"run about $7.50 a day," 60 less than the minimum wage by United
States labor law!
American industry's utilization of the Border Industrialization
Program originated when U.S. markets and profitability in par-
ticular industries were being eroded by imports and their associated
lower costs in manufacturing. 61 The United States legislative
means for the utilization of the program by U.S. industry was al-
ready in effect and no change in the United States law was necessi-
tated in order to accommodate U.S. industry.6" Item 807.00 of
55. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES ART. 123, § VI. See
generally Demeure, Labor Legislation Considerations for American Companies
Investing in Mexico and South America, 24 Bus. LAWYER 267 (Nov. 1968).
56. San Diego Union, May 2, 1970, § A, at 9, cot. 4. Twenty-six of
the companies surveyed in the report, Survey on Border Development Program,
supra note 41, at 14, did not have any Americans employed in their border
operations. Forty-nine of the companies surveyed had two or less Americans
employed. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
57. Walker, supra note 16, at 28.
58. Id. at 28-29. The minimum wage for general workers went up an
average 15.5% as of January 1, 1970. Business Week, Jan. 17, 1970, at 102.
59. International Twin Plant Concept Fact Book, El Paso Chamber of
Commerce Section 4.10 at 2 (2 ed. 1969). The prescribed daily minimum wage
in Ciudad Juarez is currently $2.84 U.S. currency. Castro, Mexico Pay Hike
Held Insufficient, San Diego Union, Jan. 11, 1970, § G (The Southwest), at 1,
col. 1. On May 1, 1970, Mexico had a new labor law go into effect. As a re-
sult of the new law, industry claims labor costs will increase 25 percent. Budd,
Mexicans Get New Labor Law, San Diego Union, April 26, 1970, § G (The
Southwest), at 4, col. 4.
60. U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1968, at 78.
61. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
62. Richards, supra note 42, at 6-7,
Vol. I
9
Rumbaugh: American Utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Prog
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1970
MEXICAN BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
the Tariff Schedules of the United States63 applies to
articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated
components, the product of the United States, which (a) were
exported in condition ready for assembly without further fab-
rication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such arti-
cles by change in form, shape, or otherwise, and (c) have
not been advanced in value or improved in condition except
by being assembled and except by operations incidental to
the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating, and
painting.
That which is undertaken under these guidelines set forth by the
Tariff Schedules may be returned to the United States and be
subject to custom duties on the "value added" to the raw materials
originally exported from the United States rather than on the en-
tire finished product.
Thus, processing, fabricating, and a change of form that takes
place on U.S. raw materials on foreign land call for full custom du-
ties and this determines the degree of manufacturing to be com-
pleted in the United States. All other specialization in the manu-
facturing procedure of a product is completed in Mexico.64
The primary economic advantage in the utilization of the
program is the labor cost. The "value added" in the determination
of the duty applicable to the imported product is essentially the cost
of the foreign labor. But the "value added" could also be com-
puted upon other inputs to the finished product such as raw ma-
terials from countries other than the United States which may be
incorporated in the product and be subject to duty.
The total value of all products imported under item 807.00 of
the Tariff Schedules has increased by 280 percent from 1965 to
1968.65 Yet the value of U.S. raw materials included in the fin-
ished product has increased by over 350 percent for a similar pe-
riod which reflects an increase in the use of U.S. made components
in the product. And the percentage of all U.S. raw materials in-
corporated in the imported product by value in 1968 amounted
63. 19 U.S.C. § 807.00 (1963). See 19 U.S.C. § 806.30 (1963), a similar
provision covering articles of metal exported for additional processing and re-
turned to the United States for further processing.
64. Richards, supra note 42, at 2.
65. Total value of imports under item 807.00 were $498.2 million in 1965
and $1.4 billion in 1968. Letter from Robert L. Hirshberg to the Hon. Bob
Wilson, November 24, 1969, on file at the CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL OFFICE.
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to a mere 16.1 percent.66
The total value of imports from Mexico under item 807.00
amounted to only 5 percent of the total value of all imports under
the item for 1968.67 Yet, the value of the U.S. raw materials in
these imports from Mexico amounted to 22 percent of the total
value of all U.S. raw materials incorporated in all imported prod-
ucts that entered under the item during 1968.68 The percentage
of U.S. raw materials incorporated in the imported product from
Mexico by value in 1968 was 68 percent compared to the 16.1 per-
cent figure for all imports under the item. These figures tend to
indicate that U.S. industry and U.S. labor are substantially involved
in the production of raw materials that are eventually incorporated
in imported products from Mexico under item 807.00 relative to
all other imports under the item.69
The use of the Mexican Border Industrialization Program has
enabled U.S. industry to recapture lost volume in sales from
wholly foreign-manufactured products. At the same time U.S.
labor has benefited in its task of providing the raw materials and
machinery that are exported to Mexico in order to be used in the
assemblage operations in Mexico. 70
There are ancillary economic benefits from the utilization of
the Mexican Border Industrialization Program by U.S. industry:
1. Establishment of shipping and warehouse operations in
U.S. border cities to work in conjunction with the Mexican
plant.71
2. The impact upon the economy of U.S. border cities
66. Total value of U.S. raw materials included in products imported under
item 807.00 in 1965 amounted to $63.6 million and in 1968 amounted to $225.7
million. Id.
67. Total value of imports from Mexico under item 807.00 amounted to
$73.3 million in 1968. Id. In 1969 $145 million worth of products incorporat-
ing U.S. manufactured parts entered the United States from Mexico. Business
Week, May 2, 1970, at 28.
68. Total value of U.S. raw materials included in products imported from
Mexico under item 807.00 was $49.5 million in 1968. Letter from Robert L.
Hirshberg to the Hon. Bob Wilson, supra note 65.
69. All imports from Mexico under item 807.00 may not necessarily come
from the border area as well as all imports from the border area may not be
included in item 807.00. Id.
70. Letter from John D. Jackson, Litton Industries, to the writer, November
10, 1969, on file at the CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
OFFICE; Letter from Donald J. Burke to the writer, supra note 33.
71. Industrial and Employment Potential of the United States-Mexico Bor-
der, supra note 2, at 43.
Vol. I
11
Rumbaugh: American Utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Prog
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1970
MEXICAN BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
through the utilization of the program promotes U.S.
business and provides additional employment in those
cities. U.S. products and services are provided for the
Mexican employee and his family. 72
As Ing. Jaime Bermudez, President of the Juarez Industrial
Development Board states, ". . . we Mexicans are trying to be ef-
fective commercial partners to the United States and to earn a fair
profit from our efforts, rather than looking for foreign aid to solve
our needs. 7 3
CONCLUSION
The consumer determines the market in the product he de-
mands. When he demands a low priced product, he buys it over
the same quality and reliability found in a higher priced product.
Industry responds by furnishing the product to meet this demand.
If the lower priced product demanded by the consumer is a foreign-
manufactured product rather than a wholly domestic-manufactured
product, he purchases the imported product-assuming the same
quality and reliability. United States industry must respond to this
demand for a low priced product or be forced out of the market.
This activity of the consumer contributes to the present trade sit-
uation of the United States with the balance of payments problem.
The United States government could impose reasonable im-
port restrictions on those foreign manufactured products, limiting
them to a certain percentage of a U.S. market. Such restrictions
72. On the average, fifty-five percent of the money earned weekly by the
Mexican employees of Trad Electronics in Piedras Negras, Coahuila was spent in
the city of Eagle Pass, Texas. Included in those items purchased were food,
clothing and amusements. Forty percent of their earnings were spent in Mexico
and five percent were put into savings. Approximately 80 percent of the em-
ployees now have charge accounts in Eagle Pass and 70 percent did not have said
accounts prior to their employment with Trad. Spending Pattern Employees
Trad Electronics report, supra note 27. A recent survey by the Bank of Mexico
indicates that $130 million is presently earned annually by Mexicans through
employment with plants under the Mexican Border Industrialization Program.
Of the $130 million earned, $124 million was spent in the United States. Scott-
Blair, Mexican Envoy Asks New U.S. Steps on 'friendship Trail,' San Diego
Union, July 18, 1970, § A, at 8, col. 2.
73. J. Bermudez, Services of the Juarez Industrial Development Board,
Executive Conference On World Trade, El Paso Chamber of Commerce 18
(1969). Octaviano Campos Salas, Mexican Secretary of Industry and Com-
merce, stated in Tijuana, Baja California, November 13, 1969, that the economic
benefits enjoyed by the Mexican border cities has been outstanding by the opera-
tion of American manufacturing plants there. San Diego Union, Nov. 14, 1969,
§ B (Local News), at 1, col. 4.
1970
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would protect U.S. industry and U.S. labor. But several U.S. in-
dustries in those markets affected by the competition of foreign-
manufactured products have located assembly plants in Mexico
through the utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Pro-
gram. The location of U.S. plants in Mexico has provided em-
ployment opportunities, where employment is critically needed,
for the Mexican worker. U.S. industry is competitive on the U.S.
market through the reduction of manufacturing costs which is re-
flected in the price paid for the product by the consumer. U.S.
labor has benefited from the utilization of such a program in that
U.S. raw materials produced by U.S. labor are substantially incor-
porated in the imported product from Mexico. Machinery manu-
factured in the United States by U.S. labor is utilized in the assem-
bly procedure completed in Mexico under the program.
The utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Pro-
gram by U.S. industry encourages free trade, helps a neighbor
country in its development, and improves the balance of payments
problem. A program that enables U.S. industry to manufacture
low cost products that are demanded by the U.S. consumer in-
corporating United States manufactured products-manufactured
by U.S. labor-stimulates the American economy and is a step
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